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OPEN SKIES - FEWER PLANES? 
Public policy and corporate strategy in EU-US aviation 
relations  
Martin Staniland 
The recent decision of the European Union's (EU) transport ministers to authorize the 
Commission to begin negotiation of a multilateral aviation agreement with the United 
States was long in coming and in the process was overtaken by developments in the 
airline industry itself.  
The EU has been fighting within itself since 1991 about whether the Commission should 
exercise authority that it claims under Article 113 of the EC Treaty to negotiate with 
"third countries" over international air services. In exercising such authority, the 
Commission would supplant national negotiators who are responsible for maintaining and 
modifying bilateral Air Service Agreements (ASAs) and would become the sole 
negotiator for all Member States.  
Meanwhile, American and European airlines have gone through dramatic changes in 
corporate strategy and internal structure. They have been forced to adapt to regulatory 
changes that are intended to create greater competition in an industry that has tended 
toward oligopoly and that in many countries has been the object of state ownership. On 
the American side, the deregulatory process is still running its course, eighteen years after 
the 1978 Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act. In Europe, the airlines are 
responding to the three liberalization "packages" intended to create competition within a 
single EU aviation market. More exposed on long-range routes than their American 
counterparts, European carriers have made a major strategic change from for ms of 
protectionism through efforts at intra-European cooperation to an emphasis on alliances 
with US carriers - a process that has culminated in the recently announced agreement 
between British Airways (BA) and American Airlines (AA).  
While the industry goes through this turmoil, governments have tended to press on with 
established policies or have sometimes reacted in ways that may cause further problems. 
The EU, having argued so long about the Commission's power, has finally authorized the 
Commission to negotiate with the U.S. But the trading block in air services it aspired to 
represent has effectively disintegrated, leaving a set of transatlantic airline alliances plus 
the walking wounded of liberalization, headed by Air Franc e.  
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has pressed on trying to secure "open 
skies" agreements with foreign countries, in the belief that "open skies" will lead to 
greater competition. But its tactics in obtaining such agreements raise questions about the future of competition. Those creating the alliances want anti-trust immunity: the U.S. 
uses the prospect of such immunity to pressure foreign governments (through the national 
airlines which are parties in the alliances) to accept "open skies" agreements; then 
immunity is granted. But such immunity creates the conditions for a new, protected 
oligopoly.  
This paper explores the interaction between international aviation policies and corporate 
strategies on both sides of the Atlantic. These two processes are now acting upon each 
other in ways that have serious implications for the structure of international aviation and 
for the character and level of competition in the industry.  
I emphasize here the dilemmas facing airlines as a result of the stakes they have in 
different markets and the limits and opportunities presented by their own domestic 
markets. Airlines have different histories, different stakes, and even different cultures. 
They can be assumed to be rational economic actors in seeking to maximize market share 
and increasing revenue. As with most rational actor models, however, this assumption 
gives us only the grossest insight into a category of actors: of itself, it provides no 
instrument to explore differences of behavior between those within the broader category. 
By extension, the rational economic actor assumption does not help us understand 
differences in relations between particular firms and their supposed political "protectors."  
This emphasis on the dilemmas and strategies of airlines is necessary because 
commentary on international aviation tends to concentrate on official policies and 
positions at the expense of illuminating the problems of particular firms in the industry. 
Such commentary assumes either that, in an industry historically dominated by the state, 
companies do what governments tell them to do or (as in some American writing) that the 
larger airlines effectively dictate to DOT officials and (presumably) their counterparts 
elsewhere.1  
These assumptions are mutually exclusive as generalizations. More harmfully, they 
deflect analysis from the really interesting and open question of just how official policy 
and corporate strategy in civil aviation really interact. Though historians of civil aviation 
have given us rich, full and colorful stories about the lobbying activities of such 
flamboyant individuals as Juan Trippe, Howard Hughes and, more recently, Robert 
Crandall and Freddie Laker, the larger picture of government-corporate relations remains 
hazy.  
In exploring the emerging issue of how deregulation here and in Europe is shaping 
competition and the choices of consumers, I try here only to establish how official policy 
has affected the strategies of particular categories of carriers. I concentrate on three such 
categories:  
1.  the "big three" American carriers which have expanded into international service 
after strengthening their already-strong hold on the domestic market;  
2.  European carriers (such as British Airways (BA)) based in the larger EU Member 
States which also have large stakes in long-distance routes; and  3.  European carriers (such as KLM Royal Dutch Airlines) based in smaller countries 
but with large stakes in intercontinental routes.  
Deregulation and International Aviation: 
If deregulation leads back to oligopoly, this outcome will be perversely logical. 
Advocates of airline deregulation in the US have always wanted the process extended to 
international aviation, though mainly because they believe (as they believed about 
domestic deregulation) that it will lead to greater competition. European liberalizers are 
more reticent about the international benefits of the liberalization entailed in creating a 
single EU aviation market. Such reticence may be due to the universal E U propensity to 
be preoccupied with the complexities and benefits of creating a single market to the 
exclusion of concern about its external ramifications. It may also be due to an uncertainty 
about what deregulation will do to the international stakes of EU carriers.  
Whatever the consequences may be, few observers anywhere doubt that some 
liberalization of international aviation is imperative and, indeed, long overdue. The 
industry still operates within the framework of a fifty-two-year-old trade agreement (the 
19 44 Chicago Convention) and of the several thousand bilateral Air Service Agreements 
(ASAs) to which it led. Such agreements stipulate which carriers may fly on what routes 
and with what frequency: they may also contain limits on capacity (the number of seats 
available) and provisions for regulating fares.  
The United States and like-minded partners abroad are currently seeking liberalization of 
international air transport, as of other service industries, through the medium of "open 
skies" agreements. At its purest, "open skies" means that technically-qualified carriers 
may fly internationally between whichever cities in the countries concerned they choose, 
at whatever frequency, with whatever capacity, and charging whatever fares they decide 
are commercially appropriate. Many observers expect such agreements to accelerate the 
internationalization and globalization of the airline industry, though many also think that 
they will lead to a globalization under American hegemony.  
In reality, "open skies" agreements (and indeed all bilateral aviation agreements) are 
subject to two restrictions that impede substantive internationalization. One restriction 
prevents domestic operation by foreign carriers. Under "cabotage" rules, Iberia, for 
example, may not pick up passengers in Miami and fly them on to Albuquerque, even as 
a continuing segment of an international flight from (say) Madrid to Miami. By the same 
token, under EU rules, only "Community carriers" may normally pick up passengers in 
London and fly them to Frankfurt.  
The other restriction limits foreign ownership of domestic airlines. Under US law, at least 
75% of the voting stock of a US airline must be owned by US citizens. Moreover, the 
president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and "key management officials" 
of US airlines must be US citizens. The U.S Department of Transportation (as a recent 
GAO report notes) interprets the law as requiring that effective control also be in US 
hands. Effective control means that the US citizen owners and managers of the airline must have the independence to make decisions, even if those decisions would not 
coincide with the best interests of a particular foreign investor.2 
EU law uses similar language (entailing similar problems of interpretation), stipulating 
that, to be recognized as a "Community carrier," an airline must be owned and continue 
to be owned directly or through a majority ownership by Member States and/or nationals 
of Member States. It shall at all times be effectively controlled by such states or such 
nationals.3  
US International Aviation Policy: 
Even before domestic deregulation, the US consistently favored greater 
competition on international routes, though ironically the US itself had only two 
or three carriers seriously committed to serving such routes. By contrast, many 
European states an d most developing countries have favored continued or 
modified bilateral regulation, partly out of fear of the commercial power of the 
US in this field.  
Since the advent of airline deregulation in the US in 1978, American pressure to 
relax or abolish the Chicago regime has increased and has taken two forms, one 
applied diplomatically, the other a consequence of corporate strategy.  
Diplomatic pressure has involved a diplomatic campaign to renegotiate ASAs 
toward some form of "open skies." In particular, US policy has, during the past 
eighteen years, envisaged extending deregulation to international flights. 
American officials have succeeded in renegotiating a number of bilaterals, 
especially with the smaller European states, their hope being that these more 
liberal agreements will put pressure on the more mercantilist countries (notably 
France and the UK). Such pressure would arise if liberalization of, say, air 
transport between the US and the Netherlands or the US and Belgium led to 
greater competition, the offering of greater capacity, and the lowering of fares on 
transatlantic services from Amsterdam or Brussels.  
Passengers throughout Europe might then decide that, given the short surface and 
connecting air journeys within the EU and the intense competition between the 
larger European airports, they could save money on long-distance services by 
starting their journeys from airports in countries with liberalized ASAs. London, 
Paris and Frankfurt (not to mention Rome) would lose business to Amsterdam and 
Brussels. Since European airports compete actively for customers, the potential 
winners would do all they could to ensure that passengers took advantage of their 
opportunities.  
Especially under the Carter and Clinton administrations, the US has openly 
adopted such a "divide-and-rule" tactic in dealing with the EU. The tactic has 
failed to break down the resistance of the more obdurate Member States, but it has 
(in association with a policy of encouraging alliances between US and European carriers) been highly successful in diverting trade toward more cooperative 
countries such as the Netherlands.  
But the strategy that this tactic serves does not imply that the US is in principle 
against negotiating with the EU under the "single negotiator" procedure favored 
by the EU Commission since 1990 and reasserted recently by Neil Kinnock as 
transport commissioner. The US might well be wary of this procedure, since the 
latter is promoted as a way for Europeans to get better deals from Washington by 
offering a united front. But what matters is the substance of any kind of 
multilateral agreement - whether it embodies liberal provisions for market access 
and commercial operation.  
US Corporate Strategies: 
The second source of US pressure on the Chicago regime has been commercial, 
stemming from the process of domestic deregulation (as distinct from its 
philosophy). After an early period of expanded competition, this process led to a 
substantial re-concentration of the US airline industry around five or six major 
carriers, with three of them (American, Delta, and United) controlling 58% of 
domestic traffic. How this happened is of some importance, given current fears of 
a re-enactment on transatlantic services.  
The strategy of the major carriers involved (and their power depended on) the 
creation of highly concentrated traffic hubs, through which by 1993 some seventy 
per cent of domestic passengers passed. Such hubs were often set up away from 
the traditional ports-of-entry for international traffic, in smaller cities such as 
Charlotte, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. The concentrations of traffic at these hubs 
were sufficient to sustain international services. But by the same token, the huge 
cost of developing hub-and-spoke systems and (with some carriers) the large debt 
burdens imposed by over-purchase of aircraft made it imperative to exploit hubs 
to the maximum.  
International flights were attractive because they were typically more profitable 
than domestic flights. Also, American carriers could expect to take business away 
from many of the established European airlines because their costs (relentlessly 
cut under the pressure of a deregulated market) were significantly lower. They 
could offer lower fares - and, with spare planes, large numbers of seats - and still 
make money. Carriers such as Continental and Northwest which were facing 
bankruptcy might not make money; but, by adding international flights, they 
might at least survive.  
The main barrier to this strategy was regulatory. The newcomers had to obtain 
authority under existing bilateral agreements to operate international services. 
Fortuitously, the financial problems of Pan Am and TWA (the only two US 
carriers with sizable overseas networks) moved them to sell rights on specific 
routes (though such sales required the approval of the governments concerned). Ironically, three airlines that were mainly domestic in character took over from 
two airlines, which had, arguably, concentrated too much on international 
aviation. United and American took over the bulk of the services from the UK to 
the US and shared with Delta a complex inheritance of routes from US cities to 
other European cities.  
The impact of the "900-pound-gorillas" on North Atlantic routes was initially 
dramatic and uncomfortable. By 1992, seven US airlines were operating 
scheduled services on North Atlantic routes, compared with two in 1988: 
European carriers saw their tot al share of traffic decline to 44% (compared with 
50% in 1978). While the overall market share of US carriers rose only slightly 
(the new carriers replacing the bankrupt TWA and the dissolved Pan Am), their 
impact on particular markets was substantial. For example, the market share of 
US carriers on routes between the US and Germany went up from 54.2% in 1989 
to 61.0% in 1993 and that on routes between the US and France went up from 
64.5% to 72% over the same period. Much larger proportional increases occurred 
in smaller markets, such as the US-Spain, US-Belgium, US-Scandinavia, and US-
Switzerland markets (all markets in which US airlines faced high-cost national 
carriers).  
Restrictive bilaterals, however, prevented comparable expansion by the newer 
American carriers, most notably in the US-UK market and in others, such as the 
US-Italy market. United and American replaced Pan Am and TWA at Heathrow, 
but only after some tough bargaining which had the effect of limiting subsequent 
expansion. All other American carriers were required to use Gatwick (London's 
second airport) which (apart from being regarded as less convenient) lacked the 
breadth of connecting flights that ma de Heathrow so attractive to passengers and 
airlines (and so vital for the profitability of services). The American carriers' share 
of US-UK traffic was only 41.9% in 1995, down from 46.1% in 1994 - a 
frustrating outcome for them, considering that passengers on services between the 
UK and the US constituted 34.9% of all passengers carried across the North 
Atlantic (and considering the costs of purchasing the traffic rights).4  
The American "invasion" alarmed both airline managements and officials of 
national governments and the EC, especially in view of the financial exposure of 
European airlines on international routes (discussed below). Such alarm has, 
however, abated recently, to be replaced by an increasing concern about the 
implications of alliances between US and European carriers.  
But use of the term "invasion" itself begged questions about the aims of corporate 
strategy and, indeed, about the limits on pursuing such strategy. American carriers 
could expand their shares of international traffic with the acquiescence of liberal 
foreign governments and could, with the same support, draw traffic from other 
European hubs. But cabotage rules prevented them from setting up their own 
feeder networks within Europe (just as they prevented European airlines from 
setting up such networks within the US). Moreover, not even the most liberal EU Member State would encourage an American carrier to strip traffic from its own 
national airlines (especially since the most liberal states also had carriers 
dependent on long-distance flights).  
Equity purchase in European carriers was no solution, at least if the purpose was 
control. Law in the EU and the US (as noted above) firmly restricted foreign 
ownership of shares in national airlines. In any case, opportunities for stock 
purchase were limited by the fact of extensive government ownership.  
But American carriers did not need to go to the expense of buying into European 
airlines, or (equally expensively) operating their own flights and hubs within 
Europe. What they needed was to control "feed" from European markets onto 
their transatlantic flights at levels and through hubs comparable to those available 
from their American networks. EU airlines (especially but not only those based in 
smaller countries) had an equally compelling need to gain access to the huge US 
domestic market. In doing so, they faced the same regulatory barriers as American 
carriers trying to penetrate the European market. But they also had to deal with 
the daunting power of "fortress hubs" controlled by the "Big Three" American 
carriers and their fellow hubbists.  
"Enterprise alliances" between American and European airlines were the solution, 
albeit a pragmatic and imperfect solution. As one airline official put it succinctly: 
"Alliances are ... a reasoned response to an antiquated regulatory system ... [They] 
permit indirect access to restricted markets."5  
However, it was asymmetry of markets, as much as regulatory restrictions on 
access to them, that, ironically, created complementarity and thus a basis for 
airline alliances. Under American law, US negotiators were required in 
negotiating bilaterals to assure "a balance of economic benefits," meaning that 
countries should receive traffic rights proportionate to the size of the national 
market they could offer. This approach necessarily implied that, given the size of 
the American market, US carriers would nearly always have much greater 
leverage in seeking rights abroad than foreign carriers would having in seeking 
rights to operate to the US.  
This provision was a continual source of irritation in ASA negotiations. The more 
domestically oriented US airlines and labor unions complained that '"open skies"' 
agreements gave airlines from smaller countries the run of the American market 
without providing comparable opportunities abroad. Foreign carriers and unions, 
for their part, feared that the "equal benefits" provision was a license for an 
American "invasion" of their markets, small as they might be.  
There were only two solutions to this problem. One was to create a market 
roughly comparable to the American market and thus create a platform for more 
equitable bargaining. Such might be the outcome of the creation of a single EU 
negotiating authority. The less belligerent advocates of the EU proposal pointed out that the US administration would be in an easier position domestically arguing 
for "open skies" with the EU than pushing on with negotiations with such 
countries as Luxembourg and Austria.  
The other solution was to encourage or acquiesce in commercial arrangements 
that effectively increased the traffic flow available to American carriers. Alliances 
might provide such a flow, the size of which (as at smaller city hubs in the US) 
might be much greater than the traffic that the relevant local city could generate. 
If, that is, a European carrier was sufficiently enterprising and attractive to 
passengers, it could create a regional network that would pull in traffic somewhat 
as "fortress hubs" did in the US. To understand the relative attractiveness of such 
an arrangement to different European carriers, it is necessary first to examine the 
diversity of stakes held by such carriers and the range of strategies open to them.  
The Dilemmas of European Airlines: 
The European airline industry differs radically from its American counterpart in 
its historical development and consequently in the way in which its market stakes 
are distributed. Most European airlines still have a larger stake in international 
(including long-distance) markets than American airlines.6 This stake is partly a 
legacy of the earlier role of national airlines in imperial communications, but it 
also reflects the economic and geographic impediments to developing an airline 
purely within Europe, let alone within one country. Shorter distances made it 
difficult for airlines to compete with railways or even road transport, whereas 
longer distances (as in the US) have favored development of a strong domestic 
airline industry. In terms of population, even the larger national markets fall short 
of the American domestic market.  
Historically, then, the two airline industries developed in opposite directions. The 
European industry emphasized first inter-continental, then European, and finally 
domestic business: the American industry grew for many decades as a domestic 
industry , with a separate and specialized international sector dominated by one 
airline, Pan American. (Indeed, the demise of Pan Am demonstrated to American 
airline executives the folly of trying to run international service without a large 
domestic feeder network)  
However, important as the broad distinction between European and American 
carriers is, equally important for understanding EU aeropolitics are differences 
between European airlines. Such differences can usefully be related, first, to the 
size of their national markets and, secondly, to the distribution of their market 
stakes between domestic, European, and intercontinental operations.  
"National market" crudely equates with population size, modified (in the case of 
air transport) by real income and physical size. Thus even in densely populated 
countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, there is little or no market for 
domestic aviation because short route distances put airlines at a disadvantage relative to rail and road transportation. Physically larger countries offer greater 
opportunities for airlines, but (absent heavy subsidization) whether this potential 
is realized will depend partly on income levels.  
The size of a country's population is necessarily an important factor in how much 
traffic will flow into and out of an airport, but there is only a rough correlation 
between population size and (in this case) transatlantic traffic. Centrality helps to 
explain the relatively large share of transatlantic traffic passing through 
Amsterdam and Brussels (5.7% and 2.5% respectively of the 1989 total), just as 
the relatively low shares of Spain and Scandinavia (3.9% and 2.9% respectively) 
reflect peripheral positions within Europe. London's predominant position (with 
34.9% of all transatlantic traffic) is due to its excellent network of onward 
connections southward and eastward.  
Table 1: European Union Airlines Traffic Share  
Politics and corporate strategy also shape a country's prominence in the 
international aviation market. The relatively low share of Italy at 5.9% is 
surprising, given its tourism and its population: it is partly due to the restrictive 
bilateral between the US and Italy. Moreover, traffic figures also reflect the 
preferences of airlines and their success in attracting traffic.  
How each airline has spread its market stakes has been partly shaped by the 
opportunities that location and national market offer and partly by commitments 
imposed by imperial government and opportunities created by trade and 
migration. Explanations a side, European airlines vary considerably in how much 
of their traffic and their revenue derive from intercontinental routes.  
Using the criteria of market size and distribution of market stakes, it is possible to 
construct a typology that, although simple, helps to illuminates the dilemmas and 
strategies of particular carriers:  
1.  Large market/smaller carrier stake in long-distance market 
(examples: Alitalia, Iberia);  
2.  Large market/larger carrier stake in long-distance market 
(examples: BA, Lufthansa, Air France);  
3.  Small market/smaller carrier stake in long-distance market 
(examples: SAS, Olympic, Aer Lingus, TAP Air Portugal, Luxair);  
4.  Small market/larger carrier stake in long-distance market: 
(examples: KLM, Sabena, Swissair).  
By definition, those carriers in categories (1) and (3) are of little significance in 
trying to understand transatlantic diplomacy and corporate strategies. However, 
they are politically significant, since their governments can support or oppose EU 
policy. Several of these carriers are state-owned and are based in the southern European countries that have been least enthusiastic about liberalization, whether 
applied to the EU internal market or to relations with third countries.  
For purposes of understanding the current arguments about international aviation 
and alliance making, the two important categories are therefore categories (2) and 
(4).  
Large countries with large international market stakes:  
Those in category (2) have attracted most attention. Not only are they the largest 
carriers in Europe, but the support of their governments is crucial to the shaping 
and acceptance of EU international aviation policy. The carriers concerned are 
based at airports that both serve relatively large domestic markets and have 
excellent networks of onward connections. These airports control the bulk of 
North Atlantic traffic: in 1993, 21,018,000 passengers of a total of 31,900,000 
traveling between the US an d Europe passed through British, French and German 
airports.  
By the same token, however, foreign carriers are attracted to such airports. The 
national carriers in fact control a smaller proportion of international departure 
slots than do their counterparts at airports in smaller countries (let alone US 
carriers at their hubs), and the national governments are under greater pressure 
from American carriers and the US government to arrive at "open skies" 
agreements.7  
Table 2: European Union Airlines Derivation of Revenue  
The potential for disputes with third country governments is increased by the 
large stakes that BA, Air France and Lufthansa have in long-distance markets. In 
1990, the North Atlantic market alone accounted for 19% of all BA's non-
domestic traffic, with corresponding figures of 15.2% and 8.8% for Lufthansa and 
Air France respectively.8 But, by 1993, the market share of Air France had fallen 
to approximately 31% of US-France traffic, while that of Lufthansa had fallen to 
40% of US-Germany traffic, whereas UK carriers (BA and Virgin Atlantic) had 
57% of US-UK traffic. The dramatically larger share of UK carriers was 
attributed by critics (in the US and elsewhere in Europe) to restrictions on access 
to Heathrow.  
With the large markets involved and the large international stakes held by national 
carriers, it is not surprising that France, Germany and the UK have resisted "open 
skies" proposals. France renounced her ASA with the US in 1991, German 
officials talked of doing so, and the British have been involved in a tense running 
battle with the US DOT throughout the last decade.  
BA's strategic dilemma is somewhat different from the dilemmas facing Air 
France and Lufthansa. It is privately owned and faces an aggressive British competitor, Virgin Atlantic, on transatlantic routes. Its stake in the domestic UK 
market is smaller relatively than the stakes of Air France/Air Inter and Lufthansa 
in their domestic markets.9 While BA has recently absorbed several competitors 
(and franchised itself to others), its main strategy is external. Thus BA's former 
chairman, Lord King, reportedly said that he did not care what the British 
government did about the domestic market: "I really don't mind ... it's overloaded 
and it doesn't pay."10  
What does pay is long-distance services, even on the competitive North Atlantic. 
Though (as Table 3 shows) the Atlantic routes were not as profitable as those to 
Africa, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, they brought in 32% of BA's 
revenue. 11 Moreover, BA had over years of hard bargaining by the British 
government collected rights to twenty-two American cities.  
 
TABLE 3: REVENUES AND PROFITS, FY 1993-4 
REGION  REVENUE: ($ 
mn) 
PRE-TAX 
OPERATING PROFIT: 
($ mn) 
PROFIT 
RATE: (%)  
EUROPE   3,6000 (38.5%) 103.5 (13.9%)  2.7 
AMERICAS   3,000 (32.0%)   193.5 (26.0%)  6.4 
AFRICA, MIDDLE 
EAST, & AFRICA  1,350 (14.4%)  304.5 (40.9%)   22.5  
FAR EAST & 
AUSTRALIA  1,400 (15.1%)  142.5 (19.2%)  10.0  
TOTAL  9,350  744.0  7.9 
Source: "BA maintains profitable edge," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 June 
1994, 31.  
 
Even with these rights, BA was at a serious disadvantage in dealing with 
the newer US international carriers. Its rights were concentrated in the 
more traditional east and west coast ports-of-entry. When it did get access 
to such inland fortress hubs as Atlanta and Dallas, BA was unable to draw 
on the concentrations of traffic developed at these hubs by the dominant 
American carriers. While it carried 64% of traffic between New York and 
London in 1993, its share at Dallas and Atlanta was only between 35% 
and 40%. This weakness was directly due to the extensive and streamlined 
networks of connections established by American Airlines and Delta at 
these two cities, in contrast to the more open and competitive situations at 
east coast airports.12  BA's response involved increasing its access to connecting traffic on both 
the European and the American sides. It set out to expand its market share 
within the EU, while (following a familiar MNC approach) consolidating 
its home base - in the UK but especially in London. BA has, indeed, been 
among the most enthusiastic supporters of liberalization and the single 
aviation market: it has also been the most aggressive EU carrier in 
building up affiliates and venturing onto new routes in Europe. 
Liberalization has created ever-larger opportunities for dominating the 
European market as cabotage restrictions are lifted. Further, the single 
market, when complete, will allow all EU carriers to operate long-distance 
flights from points in Member States other than their own (a little-noticed 
provision that obviously undermines any power to negotiate ASAs left to 
Member States).  
BA's European strategy has served the immediate objectives of drawing 
more traffic into London and enlarging market share and revenue in the 
European market itself. However, compared with its aggressive advocacy 
of "open skies" within Europe, it has been fairly unenthusiastic both about 
liberalizing the UK-US market and about the EU's proposal to take over 
bargaining with Washington. BA initially made it clear that it regarded a 
consolidated single market in Europe as an important platform for its 
strategy:  
We need the Community [Lord King remarked in May 1991] to begin to 
make use of its negotiating strength against strong countries outside ... 
only then can "open skies" be an economic and commercial reality.13  
Subsequently, however, BA officials have worried publicly about the 
possibility of UK carriers losing existing traffic rights and about the 
fairness of Brussels in distributing any new rights that might be won. The 
British government, for its part, has consistently opposed the 
Commission's proposal, on grounds of principle (that national sovereignty 
would be undermined), and has recently found itself at odds with the 
British EU transport commissioner, Neil Kinnock, albeit a former leader 
of the Labor party.  
While the source of the British government's opposition is clear, it is not 
so clear why BA, having initially (and quite logically) backed a unified 
front toward the US, subsequently edged away from this position.  
The answer may be that BA, like other EU carriers, has increasingly 
staked more on allying with American carriers than on any political 
strategy involving Brussels. What the EU proposes is essentially a trading 
bloc approach. But as BA and other EU carriers develop alliances with 
their large American counterparts, they undermine the economic and 
political basis for such an approach. In their efforts to penetrate the American market, they are in effect slicing the transatlantic market 
crosswise, creating stakeholders that have interests within both the EU and 
the US and that, indeed, are losing the national identity on which the 
Chicago system depends.  
But, in BA's case as in others, the strategy has paid off, despite its choice 
in 1992 of a financially weak US airline, USAir, as its initial American 
partner. (Other US carriers were reportedly eager for BA's hand.) BA 
obtained access to USAir's hubs in Charlotte, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh 
and was able, by application of codesharing to selected routes, to weave a 
complex if fictitious set of "direct" connections between cities on its own 
network and points on USAir's network. The appearance of such 
connections on their computer screens caused travel agents (as BA had 
hoped) to feed passengers into the BA-USAir system.  
By taking to heart E.M. Forster's injunction, "Only connect," BA (and 
other European partners of US carriers) broke into some of the fortress 
hubs that had previously been such a barrier. The percentage of passengers 
on BA's US services connecting fro m and to USAir flights rose from 12% 
(before the alliance) to 42% in 1994. Overall, BA's connecting traffic in 
North America grew by 31%.14  
Financially, the USAir alliance also paid off. By purchasing voting stock 
in USAir, BA provided capital and obtained some influence on corporate 
strategy. The main benefits, however, came from codesharing. Partly 
because USAir had a very limited inter national network, BA reaped 
considerable (and disproportionate) profits from the alliance. In 1994, it 
reported that its link with USAir had brought in $100 million in extra 
revenue, while USAir had earned an additional $20 million. Of the 
additional $100 million, $45 million had been earned directly from the 
routes to which codesharing was applied, the rest coming from traffic 
attracted by marketing and more coordinated schedules.  
BA's more recent decisions to create supplementary alliances (with 
America West and AA) reflect a wish to increase its access to the west and 
southwest of the US market. The AA alliance is, however, also a defensive 
reaction to the creation of new alliances, one involving Germany, the other 
several smaller EU states.  
Small countries with large international market stakes: 
The smaller European states (including Switzerland) are particularly 
important to understanding both why the trading bloc approach has broken 
down and how the dynamics of alliance-creation are creating a problem of 
transatlantic oligopoly. Although the larger states and their conflicts with 
the US (and the European Commission) have attracted occasional media attention, the smaller states have been central to the tactics of American 
diplomacy and to developing the new alliance systems. Indeed, their 
airlines have been more inventive and radical in their relations with US 
carriers than have those of Germany and the UK. They have set - and, 
indeed, forced - the pace.  
Three smaller country carriers - Sabena, Austrian Airlines, and Swissair - 
are in alliance with Delta (which also has a specific arrangement with 
Virgin Atlantic). This alliance has developed a "blocked space" form of 
capacity sharing, under which carriers control separately marketed 
allocations of seats on the same plane. Thus a joint flight from Atlanta to 
Zurich and Vienna might carry Swiss, Austrian, and American cabin crew 
in separate sections (and a Swiss crew on the flight deck). This 
arrangement makes it possible to offer frequent service on routes that 
would not otherwise justify it. It enables the cooperating airlines to avoid 
flying with empty seats, and also provides, via codesharing, a wider range 
of direct flights.  
"Blocked space" formulas benefit American carriers that want to draw on 
traffic from smaller countries, which do not offer enough traffic for 
regular flights of their own. They also benefit carriers in such countries 
that wish (or need) to maintain a significant presence on international and 
particularly long-distance routes. Consumers benefit to the extent that they 
can use nonstop or direct flights that might not otherwise be offered. They 
will at least know what airline controls their section of the cabin, though 
possibly not who owns or is flying the plane.15  
The dilemma facing airlines in small countries is that they cannot depend 
on domestic traffic (KLM, Sabena and Luxair have no domestic services 
at all). They must compete aggressively on international routes to succeed, 
and some have in fact been highly successful (two of the most aggressive 
Asian carriers (SIA of Singapore and Cathay Pacific of Hong Kong) are in 
fact based in virtual city-states).  
As these cases suggest, success may stem from location in an important 
business and financial center. Tourism is another source of the foreign 
traffic that is essential for survival (Swissair has both). Ex-imperial 
countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, have inherited large stakes 
in the long-distance market, sustained by the commercial and cultural 
networks that empire leaves behind.16  
While smaller EU states tend to be liberal in their approach to aviation, 
their airlines nevertheless remain national carriers, with the limits and 
advantages that this status entails. The main (perhaps sole) advantage of 
this status is control of a hub airport. The limits are those of the small 
national market.  A small state carrier can overcome these limits in two ways. One is to 
poach traffic from surrounding countries (at least if these countries are 
themselves small). The other is (as for large country carriers) to penetrate 
the American domestic market (and others that offer large concentrations 
of passengers with a propensity for foreign travel).  
KLM has been for several decades a successful and even notorious 
practitioner of the first stratagem. An airline that even between the Wars 
had established a reputation for fast and efficient long-distance travel, it 
was the first European carrier to begin regular scheduled service to New 
York. But with the loss of the Dutch East Indies, KLM became more 
dependent on transatlantic services. It recognized that it had to gather 
traffic from other European countries in order to sustain these services. By 
1974, well over 50% of KLM's passengers on North Atlantic services 
were so-called "sixth freedom" passengers who began or ended their 
journeys in European countries other than the Netherlands but transited 
through Amsterdam. At one point, KLM was operating fourteen 747 
services weekly on the Amsterdam-New York route alone.  
This strategy upset both the US government and other European airlines. 
Washington argued that, in emplaning so many foreign nationals, KLM 
was stretching the intent of its bilateral ASA. Moreover, it was carrying a 
disproportionate share of passenger s, given the presumption that national 
carriers would offer roughly equal capacity (a notion actually at odds with 
the "balance of economic benefits" criterion). The Dutch government felt 
that KLM was simply an enterprising and popular airline of the kind that 
American "open skies" policies were intended to reward.  
More fundamentally, however, the Dutch and the Americans did share a 
belief in liberalization. KLM, moreover, was both highly vulnerable and 
highly needy in relation to the US market. The two governments thus 
found it easy to cooperate, at least when the US could see an opportunity 
of exploiting Dutch aggressiveness to put pressure on the larger EU 
countries and to the extent that the Dutch saw a chance of getting more 
rights to American cities. Amsterdam lacked the network of onward 
connections that Heathrow had and the Dutch particularly wanted to draw 
UK transatlantic passengers to Schiphol.  
In 1989, KLM found an American codesharing partner, in Northwest 
Airlines. Northwest had two fortress hubs, at Detroit and Minneapolis, and 
its transatlantic services complemented, rather than competed with, those 
of KLM. Like USAir, it needed an injection of capital. Moreover, by 
codesharing, it could tap into KLM's extensive European feeder network 
and offer "direct" service between smaller cities on its own domestic 
system and European cities through Amsterdam. Better still, it could do all 
this without the expense of stationing planes and crews in Europe.  While this alliance resembled the BA-USAir alliance in form and 
motivation, it eventually led to much closer operational integration. But 
until 1992 it was a fairly conventional codesharing arrangement. In 
September 1992, however, the Netherlands and the US signed an "open 
skies" agreement which, sustained by a granting of antitrust immunity by 
the US Department of Justice, gave KLM and Northwest liberty to expand 
services, set their own fares, and especially to integrate operations without 
the fear o f being charged with anticompetitive practices.  
The Dutch "open skies" arrangement annoyed the European Commission, 
other Member States, and some American carriers and labor unions. The 
Commission was displeased at the unilateralism of the Dutch action, 
which it felt undermined the prospects for successful negotiation with the 
US at Community level.17 The Financial Times was less circumspect, 
describing the "open skies" agreement as "a step backwards" and 
declaring:  
Holland has seen the opportunity of establishing itself as Europe's airport 
at the expense of its neighbors. [The US is] luring individual states with 
the bait of access to its market while the opportunity lasts.18  
The subsequent history of the KLM-Northwest relationship has revealed 
the power, the problems, and the implications of international airline 
alliances. For Amsterdam, the alliance has been a dramatic success. The 
number of transatlantic passengers flying through Schiphol increased by 
74% over a five-year period, reaching 2,400,000 in 1994: in 1995, 
Amsterdam overtook Paris Charles de Gaulle as the fourth largest 
European transatlantic gateway.19 The share of the US- Netherlands 
market in overall transatlantic service went up from 5.6% in 1978 to 7.7% 
in 1993.  
Commercially, this alliance was, like the BA-USAir arrangement, highly 
profitable, generating annually between $125 million and $175 million in 
new revenue for Northwest and $100 million for KLM. It also captured 
some $16.5 billion's worth of traffic from EU carriers and $25 billion's 
worth from US carriers.  
From Trading Bloc To Alliance System: Issues and 
Implications: 
The KLM-Northwest alliance is, for two reasons, historically more 
important that any relationship involving larger EU carriers and states.  
First, it demonstrated the potential of highly-integrated operations in 
transatlantic alliances, going further than the BA-USAir alliance in coordinating schedules, marketing, and the sharing of aircraft and 
servicing facilities, all in pursuit of the ideal of "seamless service."  
Secondly, it provided the model for a corporate alliance facilitated by 
diplomatic and legal sanction. This model - involving, on the corporate 
side, a close relationship (with or without equity purchase) and, on the 
governmental side, an "open skies" agreement and the granting of antitrust 
immunity - is now being faithfully followed by United (in its relationship 
with Lufthansa and SAS) and Delta (in its relationship with Austrian, 
Sabena and Swissair).  
Indeed, one incident in the history of the KLM-Northwest alliance may 
have marked, more than any action in the political or diplomatic domain, a 
watershed in the strategies of the smaller European states. More broadly, 
this episode illustrates better than any other how far European airlines 
have abandoned intra-European alliances and its political counterpart, the 
EU's single negotiator/trading bloc approach, in favor of lateral, 
transatlantic relationships.  
In 1993, four small market carriers - KLM, SAS, Swissair, and Austrian 
Airlines - spent ten months in negotiating to establish an alliance (called 
the Alcazar alliance) that would unite the smaller carriers in the face of 
BA, Air France, and Lufthansa . SAS, Swissair, and Austrian had already 
developed a significant degree of cooperation, and by November they and 
KLM had reached sufficient agreement to justify collectively approaching 
the US DOT to probe probable American attitudes to the "fourth force ." 
Only one week later, the negotiations collapsed, and did so solely because 
the airlines found that they had "fundamentally different views on a US 
partnership." Specifically, while its partners had (and wished to continue) 
an alliance with Delta, KLM insisted that Northwest should be the 
American partner for the Alcazar group.  
The failure of Alcazar was a major turning point for the carriers 
concerned. KLM intensified its relationship with Northwest; Swissair, 
Austrian and Sabena developed a closer alliance with Delta; and SAS 
scaled down its ambitions and has become a junior ally of Lufthansa in its 
alliance with United. The cumulative power of these alliances then pushed 
BA into its new alliance with AA, with BA publicly arguing that 
otherwise it would be "left on the shelf."20  
Certainly on the shelf are those EU carriers that do not have a US partner - 
the most conspicuous example being Air France, which has presided over 
a continued stagnation of transatlantic traffic into Paris. Despite all the 
years of argument in Brussels about the relevance of Article 113 to 
international aviation, the bloc for which the Commission aspired to 
negotiate has in reality collapsed, and the North Atlantic market has been sliced into a set of corporate alliance systems. These systems have be en 
created as a strategy for bypassing the restrictions that the archaic 
regulatory regime of bilateral ASAs has imposed on airlines that find 
themselves faced with more intensive competition, partly as a result of 
deregulation in the EU and the US.  
Where does this leave the EU single negotiator proposal? Reflecting the 
usual divergence between Community policy and corporate strategy, the 
EU has now agreed to allow the Commission to negotiate for a multilateral 
agreement with the US. The negotiations in question seem to have a 
different agenda from that which was intended back in 1991. They are to 
create a framework for a "common aviation area," meaning the 
establishment of some broad principles which "will allow air carriers of 
both sides to pro vide their services in the European and US markets on 
purely commercial principles." Subject to some special circumstances, the 
EU's guidelines allow for cabotage within both the US and the EU 
markets, for the removal of all restrictions on capacity and o n the number 
of carriers serving particular routes, and for minimal control of fares. They 
also provide for lifting the limit on foreign purchase of airline equity up to 
49% in both the EU and the US, and they allow for extensive code sharing 
and blocked space agreements, subject to rules ensuring fair competition 
and full information for consumers.21  
These guidelines come so close to US policy that it is a challenge to 
identify basic issues for negotiation. Indeed, discussion on transatlantic 
aviation is shifting increasingly toward issues of competition policy and 
consumer protection, and away from the earlier emphasis on protecting 
national markets and national carriers. On both sides of the Atlantic, the 
markets are already penetrated: that is how the national carriers have 
protected themselves in the face of the liberalization and deregulation that 
governments have forced on them and of the competitive pressures they 
apply to each other. Policy-makers will now have to deal with the 
implications of highly rationalized alliance systems in which traffic is fed 
through a selection of international fortress hubs on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  
The technical and marketing features of the emerging system are clearly 
apparent and quite sophisticated. Through the electronic manipulations of 
codesharing, small towns will in future be linked by "international" 
services to small towns on the other side of the Atlantic. Rather than 
continue the earlier strategy of trying to connect smaller cities directly to 
each other, using smaller planes, the airlines are developing international 
hub-and-spoke systems - so-called "double barbells" - which (in the case 
of the Northwest/KLM alliance) will connect 201 cities in the US and 
Canada through Northwest's US hubs and through Amsterdam to 107 
European cities. This strategy offers altogether 21,708 permutations for connecting flights between "beyond" cities across the Atlantic.22 The 
overall scope of the alliance systems is staggering: including all routes 
flown, the BA/AA-led alliance will serve 36,000 city-pairs throughout the 
world, while the Lufthansa/United/SAS-led alliance will serve 55,212 
city-pairs.23  
Uncomfortable as travel on such a system may be for travelers required 
once more to pass through congested hubs, the fact is that airlines cannot 
afford to operate international services in markets that can only offer, say, 
ten passengers a day. Nevertheless, the much-proclaimed "globalization" 
of air transport looks as if it will be accompanied by concentration both of 
traffic and of ownership. US airlines have actually been cutting capacity 
on North Atlantic routes in order to fill planes and improve profits.  
Now there is a prospect of decreased competition, accelerated by the new 
AA-BA alliance, which will control 61% of seats between the US and 
London and 24% of all traffic between the US and Europe. Globally, in 
1995 five alliances (all including one or more major American carrier) 
flew 53% of all revenue-earning airline mileage in the world: the AA-BA-
USAir alliance (which also includes Canadian International and Qantas) 
on its own flew 18% of total global mileage.  
Such figures do conceal the unevenness of these alliances, which are 
mainly a North American and transatlantic phenomenon with (so far) little 
impact on or participation by Asian, African, Latin American and Middle 
Eastern airlines. Nevertheless, the power of the alliances, and the 
problems they pose, are likely to grow, raising again the question of 
whether some form of international competition policy is required. 
Governments have, with some cautions, acquiesced in codesharing and the 
lifting of antitrust immunity as a way of speeding the liberalization of 
international air transport. They might now consider whether it is time to 
reach an agreement (perhaps on the lines of the EU guidelines) that will 
protect not only the right of airlines to compete and to pursue commercial 
survival, but also the right of travelers to enjoy the benefits of competition 
- the promise of both deregulation in the US and liberalization in the EU.  
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